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Discussion After the Speeches of Douglas E. Rosenthal
and Calvin S. Goldman
QUESTION, Professor King: We have a joint R&D exemption
under our antitrust laws. It is always the question of whether there
should be an exemption for joint manufacturing efforts on the part of
manufacturers.
Do you have any comment on proposed legislation that would
carve out of antitrust laws an exemption for joint manufacturing? Con-
gressman Campbell, of California, at one time was talking about it.
ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: I am very fond of Tom Campbell and
his bill. I think that some version of it will pass [It now has.]. I have
been told that if there had not been a clarification, in effect a business
review letter given to Semetech, that a couple of smaller semiconductor
companies would have sued and challenged the Semetech joint venture.
There have been a couple of recent reports that, counter to the Chicago
School, Semetech may actually accomplish some constructive innova-
tion and that it may end up being a competitive enterprise, even though
it violated many rules of entrepreneurial innovation at the time of its
founding.
We may now go through a period of more collaboration among
competitors on research and development, and even on bringing prod-
ucts to production. There was a newspaper report recently about the
seriousness with which the United States Government is considering
collaboration with the Big Three American auto manufacturers in pro-
ducing an electric car that would go greater distances at greater
speeds, to be a substitute in big cities for the internal combustion en-
gine. That, of course, used to be unimaginable. In fact, the only case in
the history of U.S. antitrust enforcement where a research joint venture
was sued by the Justice Department was a joint venture in the auto
industry to develop jointly a catalytic converter. That was twenty years
ago. What a difference twenty years makes. I think those kinds of col-
laborations will take place.
I would trust there will continue to be skepticism about the need
for collaborative joint ventures among competitors in the pricing ands
marketing of products that may have been brought to the marketing
stage by collaboration. I do not think there is any economic justification
for that kind of collaboration; but I also do not think anybody is pres-
ently calling for it.
QUESTION, Mr. Stayin: The Export Trading Company Act was
passed in the early mid 1980s, and to this day there are very few com-
panies or trade associations that have taken advantage of it. Do you
have any thoughts as to why?
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ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: I have two ideas. One is that it has
been possible to do collaborative joint ventures between competitors
during this entire period, and you have not needed the safe harbor of
the Export Trading Company Act to do that.
Only one case has been brought to challenge horizontal collabora-
tion of this kind, and the law was explicitly changed in 1982 to make it
very clear that collaboration, even collaboration giving market power in
the export market, was not a violation of U.S. antitrust law. This was
something as to which there had been some doubt and some contrary
cases of the lower court levels before then. That change in the law, two
years before passage of the Export Trading Company Act, made it
largely redundant.
The other problem is that export trading companies, which are
truly just trading companies, are probably less necessary as American
businesses become more and more sophisticated. There are ways of
learning how to get into foreign markets without necessarily forming an
export trading company. An export trading company is a cover for an
export cartel. The development of European Community law, and other
competition laws, make that a more perilous enterprise. To identify
yourself with an export cartel opens you up to antitrust enforcement in
the jurisdiction where you are targeting your goods.
QUESTION, Mr. Elliott: I had a question about your very inter-
esting idea that the sort of Kuhnian paradigm of noninterventionism
that you attribute to the Chicago School is coming under increased
pressure intellectually. I was clear about the inconsistency that you saw
between the management philosophy of Demming and Geneen. How-
ever, were you suggesting that there were s6me inconsistencies between
Demming's philosophy and the Chicago School of government nonin-
tervention? Could you elaborate a little bit more on that inconsistency
because I was not clear that Demming's management philosophy spoke
to or called into question the principles of the Chicago School with
regard to the role of government as opposed to the role of management
innovation quality? Is there really the inconsistency that you see be-
tween the Chicago School of philosophy and Demming's management
.philosophy.
ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: I am glad you asked that question. I
was cut off before I could try to close the gap. I do not think this has
been articulated by anybody yet, but I do see some inconsistencies. I
am not opting clearly on Demming's side. I am only asking questions.
Let me give you one topical issue where I think there is a potential
inconsistency. Demming suggests that in terms of your long-term pro-
ductivity and competitiveness you should establish secure supply rela-
tionships with a single supplier; you should not worry about that sup-
plier taking advantage of you because you are his captive customer;
and you should not worry that he is going to get lazy in dealing with
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you. You should build a relationship of trust; show him that his interest
is in your succeeding; sit down and work with him on constantly im-
proving the product, cutting the costs, both for him and for you, and
see this as a collaborative effort. Demming would say this is one of the
ideas that has led to the power of some so-called vertical Keiretsu rela-
tionships in Japan.
The Chicago School would not say that the vertical, relationships
with the Keiretsu is particularly an antitrust problem. The basic notion
of the market that the Chicago School suggests is that one should be
concerned about being the captive of a supplier. It stresses trying to
broaden your supplier relationships every few years, by taking quotes
and bids to try to get alternative suppliers.
QUESTION, Mr. Elliott: Just to follow up, let me say that I
think somebody would debate you on that. I think the impetus of, say,
Robert Bork's ideas in antitrust have been precisely that the govern-
ment ought not to interfere with the formation of those kind of rela-
tionships if they are efficient in pursuit of some sort of etiology but,
rather, the formation of such relationships ought to be a private matter.
ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: I did not say Bork would say he wants
to attack the Keiretsu. What I said is Bork is suspicious of monopolists
and would be suspicious of your vulnerability in that circumstance.
Now, I do not know if Bork would be or not. I think many people who
would follow a Chicago School motive analysis would be. That is an,
example where they might be wrong.
Take another example. The suggestion of Chicago School econom-
ics would be that you want a free labor marketplace as much as possi-
ble in which you do not have the higher social costs of long-term, life-
time employment or high costs to provide job security for workers.
Even encouraging competition within an organization is healthy for the
competitiveness of the organization.
Now, again, I would agree that this is not central to Chicago
School thinking now. Part of the issue is whether the Chicago School
has thought about how this relates to international markets and inter-
national situations. I would suggest that some of the ideas of Demming
are open to empirical investigation and should be treated as empirical
questions, not as theoretically-given questions. Certain kinds of job se-
curity may make a worker less insecure, better able to be a productive
and efficient worker. It is not clear to me what the tradeoffs are vis-a-
vis these kinds of lifetime employment and social welfare programs.
QUESTION, Professor King: I had a question for Cal Goldman
concerning the use of predatory pricing as a means of attacking dump-
ing problems. First you have the suggestion in the Canada-U.S. context
that this device replaced anti-dumping. Is this a device that would be
usable throughout the world or is it just in a context where you have
two friendly parties?
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ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: The suggestion of replacing anti-dump-
ing laws by competition laws is only in the NAFTA context at this
stage. John Coleman of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal
made it clear that he was only talking about a Canada-U.S. or Ca-
nada-U.S.-Mexican arrangement under NAFTA. That assumes, of
course, that Mexico's competition law is up and running and operating
in an effective fashion vis-a-vis other countries. The anti-dumping laws
would still remain. That is also the reason why representatives of the
steel industry and other industries in Canada for the first time are mov-
ing over to the side of competition law, at least as between Canada and
the U.S. We would get rid of the kind of ridiculous situation we now
have where both sets of steel companies are pointing the finger at each
other.
Let me comment briefly in regard to that question of R&D joint
ventures. I saw in the Wall Street Journal recently that GM, Ford and
Chrysler have actually announced their first joint patent for a light-
weight material that could replace steel in car bodies. The comment
was made that it would have been unthinkable just a number of years
ago under the antitrust laws. That is just a start on the R&D side. If
you follow up on the Joide and Teece model, you get into much more
exchanges of information on technology and cost effectiveness.
QUESTION, Mr. Potter: I do not think the question has been an-
swered, though. Why is it that the suggestion of the competition law
replacing anti-dumping could not be applied between two other coun-
tries or between Canada and another country besides the U.S.? And, in
theory, what is wrong with it?
ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: Let us go back to Premise No. 1. The
issue at the moment, as between Canada and the U.S., is not in my
view the lack of feasibility of doing so; rather it is just a question of
political will. I think that is a real issue. It is a real world issue. We
have got to walk before we run. From my perspective, I do not see any
reason why you cannot say trade that is between Canada and the EC,
where you have a similar provision in the Treaty of Rome, would not
be replaced by those competition law provisions. There is no reason you
could not establish a mechanism either by reciprocity or treaty to do
the same thing. You have to deal with a country that has competition
laws that are largely similar. They do not, in my view, have to be iden-
tical. I see no reason for that. I do not think they have to be harmo-
nized perfectly, but they have to be similar just like our merger laws
are somewhat similar today between Canada and the U.S. I think it
can be done between Canada and the EC. I do not think it is likely to
happen in the near future, but I see no fundamental obstacle to that
occurring as well. I am not sure about any other jurisdictions, but cer-
tainly not the Far East.
ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: I think the other answer is market ac-
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cess. It is something of a shibboleth. If you perceive you are not going
to truly have access to the other person's market, then you want the
protection of the dumping law. The rationale of applying the antitrust
laws is that there truly is competition in trade between the two mar-
kets. If a company were dump selling in the United States from Japan
at a substantially lower price than it was selling in its home market, the
American competition could retaliate by going into the Japanese mar-
ket and selling at a substantially lower price. However, if the United
States firm is excluded from the Japanese market, virtually regardless
of price, then the rationale for getting rid of the dumping law does not
work.
QUESTION, Professor King- I have a question in looking at the
EC laws and the way they are administered. I notice there is an exemp-
tion for small companies under the EC rules. It is a matter of a regula-
tion. We are interested in small companies and entrepreneurs. Do you
want to comment on the need or desirability of such an exemption in
Canada and the United States?
ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: If I am not mistaken, Henry, the EC
provisions that you are referring to are the ones that were brought in in
the merger control regulation.
COMMENT, Professor King: Right.
ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: All they say is, in a nutshell, that
mergers over a certain size of annual turnover have to go to Brussels.
However, it is still the case in Europe that as a result of the merger
control regulation that was passed, there is no loss of jurisdiction for
mergers under that threshold. There is even some duplicate jurisdic-
tion. There are special rules to sort it out in certain circumstances, but
there is certainly no loss of jurisdiction for national antitrust agencies
in Germany, France, England and so on, for the smaller mergers.
I happen to believe that mergers which involve acquisitions of rela-
tively small amounts of five million or ten million dollars, call it what
you will, usually reflect instances of very low barriers. If someone can
walk in and spend minimal amounts of money, those usually should be
swept by the antitrust agency without blinking an eye, but I think it is
very hard to establish a level under which any fixed merger within the
jurisdiction otherwise of a national agency would not be looked at be-
cause there are some industries that are not global that involve regional
markets and you could, in fact, gain market power over a regional part
of the country with a relatively small merger but, by and large, those
are rare.
QUESTION, Professor King: I was talking about the rule that
exempts companies if the volume of the two companies is fifty million
or less.
ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: Germany has that.
QUESTION, Professor King- Right. It is probably covered by na-
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tional law. Doug, do you want to comment on that?
ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: Remember that our law is much less
intrusive than the European Community Law in the sense that any col-
laborative agreement, any joint venture agreement, has to be notified
under EC law if there is any restriction of competition by the collabo-
ration. This is almost inevitably going to be the case. In the United
States most collaborations do not have to be reported. It is a question
of private counseling when you have a problem. There are small busi-
ness block exemptions also on structures such as exclusive distribution,
and joint selling; but we already give exemptions for these. There
would not be sufficient market power arising from joint arrangements
subject to block exemption to raise problems under either U.S. or Ca-
nadian laws. The only area where you are not going to get either an
exemption under EC law or under our law is price fixing between two
small competitors. This is still a violation of both laws.
COMMENT, Professor King- I think it makes for good work for
lawyers to interpret what the situation is, and I think we got the
answer.
COMMENT, Mr. Goldman: One addendum to that. There are
jurisdictions, such as Germany and Australia, by way of example, that
have fixed thresholds. They do not have concentration issues under a
certain level. You do not have to worry about the transaction. You gain
certainty in that process. I think certainty is very important. There is a
tradeoff. The tradeoff is you may have a debate over whether your con-
centration level is properly measured, whether its concentrated nation-
ally or in a regional market. These are very difficult issues.
What the Canadian merger guidelines have done is not provide an
absolute green light for anybody to walk through a merger which is
under thirty-five percent concentration, but what they have said is if
you are in a realm of thirty-five percent chances are you are not going
to have a problem. It is good work for the lawyers. It provides some
certainty, but it tries to strike this balance.
QUESTION, Mr. Robinson: Following up on one of the comments
about limitation on market access, it occurs to me, from my simplistic
point of view, that, although everybody is discussing what a wonderful
thing it would be to abolish dumping between Canada and the U.S.,
unless predatory pricing laws are very sophisticated, what prevents the
large manufacturer in the U.S. with the huge economy of scale from
dumping to wipe out what is left of, let us say, the Canadian furniture
industry because he. would like to control the North American furniture
industry. If there is no dumping law, there is no way that the Canadian
manufacturer is going to be able to retaliate because it does not have
the scale to crank up to make enough furniture to dump back into the
U.S. market and absorb the huge loss that would be necessary for it to
really compete.
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, It is not just market access, it is comparative market sizes and
small size of the Canadian participants. That is why I can never under-
stand Trebilcock and everybody else who have this simplistic approach
that we will just eliminate them and predatory pricing will stop it.
Cal, would that amount to predatory pricing which could be
prevented?
ANSWER, Mr. Goldman: Let me just try this out on you. In a
free trade zone you have great opportunities in antitrust analysis to
establish a singular market. It may be a single antitrust market for
geographic purposes between Canada and the U.S. as a whole, or on
the Eastern Seaboard, or the other side of the Rockies, and if you have
a player such as one based in - take the furniture industry - North
Carolina, shipping huge amounts into Canada with~minimum difficulty,
you have a very real likelihood, for antitrust purposes, that there is one
singular antitrust market. Within that market if that player has the
potential to exercise market power to artificially raise prices beyond the
competitive norm and has, in fact, the ability to price and does price
below not just cost but below average variable costs, that is where the
Canadian predatory pricing guidelines have now gone, taking the
Areeda-Turner model. That would be examined and could be con-
strained. So your smaller player in Canada, who would otherwise be
squeezed out, after which the one with market power would raise prices
to super-competitive levels, would be allowed to survive.
What you have got is a test that has to do with competition in the
marketplace within the market and not a test that is simply based on
some artificial notion of a border and a barrier that no longer really
exists in the free trade zone.
COMMENT, Mr. Rosenthal: All I wanted to say is that you did
not say, as an essential element of your hypothetical, that he was sell-
ing at a loss for the purpose of driving them out of the market. If he
was not selling at a long-term loss, that is what competition is about.
Competition is the guy who has the economies of scale winning in the
marketplace over the little guy who does not. If we want a free market
between Canada and the United States it means we want the efficient
producer selling everywhere in North America. We want this even if
that is going to hurt a firm in Tennessee or a firm in Ontario.
QUESTION, Mr. Robinson: Can the steel manufacturers in Ca-
nada have this then, too?
ANSWER, Mr. Rosenthal: The Canadian steel manufacturers
would love to have this now.
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